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In a recent symposium at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Virgílio Afonso da 
Silva, Alon Harel, and Iddo Porat offered critical comments on my book The 
Global Model of Constitutional Rights.1 Their criticisms relate, first, to the book’s 
methodology (in particular the nature of my theory as morally reconstructive, and 
its global character), second, to the role of autonomy (in particular its relation to 
equality, and my defence of a general right to autonomy), and third, to the 
problem of justification (outcome-based versus excluded reasons-based ways of 
reasoning about questions of rights). Correspondingly, I divide this response into 
three sections, dealing with the methodological questions in the first, with the 
autonomy-related issues in the second, and with the problem of justification in the 
final section.  
 
 
 
I. METHODOLOGY 
 
1. MORAL RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Any morally reconstructive theory is Janus-headed: it looks to both fit with the 
practice and moral value. Thus, a morally reconstructive theory of the global 
model of constitutional rights must meet two criteria: first, it must ‘fit’ the global 
model sufficiently well to be rightly considered a theory ‘of’ that practice, and 
second, it must be morally coherent. If, on the one hand, my theory did not have 
sufficient fit, then it would simply be a free-standing theory of rights – indeed it 
might be excellent in this regard, but it could not claim to be a theory of the global 
model. If, on the other hand, my theory were morally incoherent, it could not 
claim to be a moral reconstruction. The goal of the book is to show that the global 
model, which departs in so many ways from how almost all moral and political 
philosophers think about rights, is morally defensible. A morally incoherent theory 
obviously could not be used to demonstrate this claim. It is of course a possibility 
that a practice is morally indefensible: that it cannot be reconstructed in a way 
which fits the practice and shows it as morally appealing (think of Nazi law as an 
extreme example). Where that is the case, it must be concluded that the practice 
ought to be abandoned or radically changed, precisely because no theory that fits 
that practice sufficiently well displays moral coherence.  
This Janus-headedness is the source of some confusion. There are three 
avenues available to a critic to criticise a morally reconstructive theory: he can 
criticise the methodology as such; he can claim that the theory does not fit the 
practice well enough; or he can claim that the theory is morally incoherent. To the 
extent that the commentators chose the third avenue, I will deal with their 
1 Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012) (henceforth: GMCR). 
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arguments in the following sections. Here, I will respond to their challenges of the 
methodology and the charge of insufficient fit. 
Porat makes some criticisms relating to my reconstructive methodology. He 
says: ‘I would […] have preferred that Moller would simply say: I will give you my 
version of the best normative account of rights, and show you that it is closer to 
the global model than the American one.’2 
This sounds straightforward. However, had I followed Porat’s advice, my 
book would have been disingenuous. The idea that triggered the process that led 
to the book was precisely not to develop the best possible theory of rights. Rather, 
I had observed that philosophers tend to talk about rights in a way that is 
structurally quite far removed from how most courts approach them (e.g. they 
perceive rights as trumps; they see social rights as an anomaly; they think that 
rights are limited in scope). My moral intuition was that whatever the merits of the 
philosophers’ view, the courts had a defensible and coherent conception of rights, 
and my motivation for starting the research that culminated in the book was to 
demonstrate this. Thus, had I followed Porat’s advice I would have had to hide my 
true ambitions. I would have had to say: ‘Look, I have developed a new theory of 
rights. And what a coincidence, it also explains the global practice quite well!’ But 
it was not a coincidence; it was a deliberate plan.  
This is not just a piece of personal anecdote. Theorists often want to explain 
something important about a certain practice. Therefore, they must develop their 
theories with the practice in mind, and they cannot wait until the very end, after 
they have constructed their entire theory, to examine the extent to which the 
theory illuminates the practice. If what the theorist wants to explain about the 
practice is its moral defensibility, then she is engaged in a moral reconstruction. Of 
course, her project might be a different one, for example, she might be interested 
in some sociological, historical, or cultural aspect of the practice, in which case its 
moral defensibility will be irrelevant or at least not central.  
In the sentence following the one quoted above, Porat modifies his claim and 
says: ‘Or [I would have preferred Möller to say]: for too long the imagination of 
the philosophical account of rights has been limited by the American experience 
and it is time to break this limitation; I will give you a philosophical account the 
imagination of which is based on the European model.’3 
I have no fundamental objection to this way of putting the goal of my book – 
we could indeed say, without too much distortion, that it is about a philosophical 
account of rights the imagination of which is based on the European (I would 
prefer: global) model. This at least makes it clear that I am not starting the 
development of my theory of rights ‘out of the thin air’ but rather with a certain 
practice (the global model) in mind. But then I wonder what Porat’s criticism of 
my methodology actually is; I cannot identify a significant difference between my 
way of putting it (moral reconstruction) and his in the quote above. Porat 
2 Iddo Porat, (title tbc), p. 7 (forthcoming [2014] Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies).  
3 Ibid.  
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recommends that I should have relied on Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium;4 in 
his view this would have highlighted the two-directional relationship between 
theory and fact more clearly than my account, and it would also have made it clear 
that my theory is clearly normative. But I do not see how I could have made it 
clearer that my theory is two-directional – as I explained above as well as in the 
book, this is precisely what a moral reconstruction is about; and I cannot see, 
either, how I could have made it clearer that my theory is normative – in fact 
moral; that is even expressed in referring to it as a ‘morally reconstructive theory’. 
Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium is not far removed from my methodology, but 
at least in Rawls’ usage, it relates to certain judgments that have to be brought into 
coherence,5 whereas my theory is about a practice (the global model). Therefore I 
could not have used Rawls’ term without modifications and clarifications that 
would in substance have amounted to explaining the same issues that I explained 
in the book under the heading of ‘moral reconstruction’.  
A further criticism of Porat’s is that ‘to the extent that Moller remains 
committed to the idea of reconstruction and description his project needs more 
historical and cultural context’.6 As a preliminary point, I am not sure why or to 
what extent my book can be read as being ‘committed to the idea of description’. 
The goal of my book is to offer a theory of rights that explains and justifies the 
global model; thus, the book presents a moral theory of rights. Given that it is a 
reconstructive theory of rights, it relates to a practice: it is the theory ‘of’ that 
practice. I do give an account of the practice that is being reconstructed in the 
book, mainly in chapter 1. Does Porat mean that this account should have been 
more comprehensive? If so, then Porat would need to explain this further. I 
cannot know whether I should have given a more comprehensive overview of the 
global model unless he shows me which information, in his view, is missing, and 
how it would have been relevant for the theory. He does point to a passage where 
I talk in passing about how the attitudes and beliefs of people about the moral 
structure of rights have changed; but I fail to see how the argument that I make at 
that passage would have benefited from a cultural or historical investigation. Of 
course, it is always possible to provide more background information, paint a 
more comprehensive picture, and so on. But the real issue is whether this 
additional information is necessary for the argument that the work advances, and I 
fail to see why this should be the case in the passage Porat points out.  
Maybe Porat’s point is a different one. Maybe he means that one cannot 
develop a morally reconstructive theory of rights without a cultural and/or 
historical theory of the practice that is being reconstructed. If this is his criticism, 
then I disagree: a morally reconstructive theory is simply a different project from a 
culturally or historically reconstructive theory. I do not deny the value of the latter; 
4 Ibid..  
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised edition, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 18.  
6 Porat (above n. 2), p. 7.  
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in fact I think that Porat’s and Cohen-Eliya’s book Proportionality and Constitutional 
Culture7 offers an insightful cultural reconstruction of the global model and its 
American counterpart. But it is a different project from mine. Let us again take the 
extreme example of a theory of Nazi law. A theorist engaged in a moral 
reconstruction of Nazi law would have to ask whether Nazi law can be brought 
into a morally coherent system. One does not need much cultural or historical 
understanding to conclude that the answer is negative: whatever the culture or 
history of a place, laws such as the Nuremberg race laws can never be morally 
defensible. By way of contrast, a different theorist who is interested in a historical 
or cultural reconstruction of Nazi law could possibly develop an illuminating 
theory about the historical or cultural context within which Nazi law arose. It 
would be an unjustified criticism of the first theorist to accuse him of not giving a 
comprehensive cultural and historical analysis of Nazi law; this is simply not 
needed for the task that that theorist set himself. The analogous point applies to 
my project of a morally reconstructive theory of rights: while of course a 
comprehensive historical or cultural analysis of the global model is highly 
interesting for a variety of reasons, it is not necessary for a moral reconstruction.  
Porat’s final criticism in his passage relating to my reconstructive 
methodology is that I do not talk enough about the procedures for judicial review 
(for example, should there be strong or weak judicial review) and about 
institutional questions.8 But again, this is not the topic of the book. My book is not 
a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of judicial review. Rather, it 
articulates a theory of rights – in this regard its ambition is similar to those of 
other authors who have articulated theories of rights: think of Ronald Dworkin’s 
theory of rights as trumps,9 or James Griffin’s theory of rights as protecting 
personhood.10 Just as these and other authors can articulate their theories of rights 
without addressing procedural and institutional questions, so can I. My theory of 
rights can be implemented in a system of strong or weak judicial review; it can be 
applied to judges who are elected or appointed; etc. All the book tries to achieve is 
to articulate a theory of rights which makes sense of the emerging global practice 
that I have called the global model. Porat may object that I talk about institutional 
questions in chapter 5 of the book, where I make a case for the institutional 
competence of judges to decide questions of rights.11 But I stress in the relevant 
section that my goal is not to give a comprehensive account of the institutional 
questions but rather to assess them only in so far as this is necessary to confirm 
the validity of the theory of rights that I propose. In other words, I only ask 
whether a plausible case can be made for the involvement of courts in adjudicating 
7 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge University Press, 
2013).  
8 Porat (above n. 2), pp. 7-8.  
9 Dworkin has defended this position throughout his career; see for example his ‘Rights as Trumps’ in 
Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984). For a more recent restatement see his 
Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 329. 
10 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 32-37.  
11 GMCR, pp. 126-131.  
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rights issues according to the theory proposed, because if no such case can be 
made, then this would throw doubts on the correctness of my reconstructive 
account.12 So, to repeat, the book does not claim to give a comprehensive account 
of the institutional questions; it simply articulates a theory of rights which, as it 
shows, can be applied by courts, without assessing all the pros, cons, and 
modalities that such an application would entail.  
A second charge that could be launched against my theory is that of 
insufficient fit, and indeed, all three commentators raise more or less the same 
point here: how can I claim, they ask, that my theory is a reconstruction of the 
global model when, with the possible exception of Germany, no jurisdiction in the 
world accepts what seems to be a crucial element of my theory, namely a 
comprehensive right to autonomy that protects all exercises of autonomy, 
including trivial and evil ones?13 The theoretical question this criticism raises is 
how much ‘fit’ is required for a reconstructive theory to still be a theory ‘of’ the 
practice it seeks to reconstruct, as opposed to what in the book I called a 
‘philosophical’ theory, that is, one which is insensitive to the practice.  
There is no simple, mechanical, or quantitative answer to this question; it is 
one that requires the exercise of judgment. But it is important to get the question 
right. The correct way of posing the question is not to take the one feature where 
the practice and the theory depart and then to ask whether with regard to this 
feature, the theory displays sufficient fit. This cannot be the right approach 
because no reconstructive theory of a diverse and complex practice will fit all its 
features. Rather, the correct way of asking the question is whether the theory as a 
whole fits the practice as a whole sufficiently well to be regarded a theory ‘of’ that 
practice. Applied to the issue at stake here, the correct question is not whether the 
idea of a right to autonomy fits sufficiently well that aspect of the practice of 
judicial review that mostly denies the existence of such a right. Rather, the issue is 
whether the entire theory of rights as proposed in my book fits the practice under 
the global model as a whole so well that it can be regarded as a theory of that 
practice. Alternatively, one may ask whether the entire theory of rights as proposed 
in the book fits the rights jurisprudence of a given country so well that it can be 
regarded as a theory of that country’s jurisprudence. So, to put it bluntly, a lack of 
fit with regard to the scope of rights can be counterbalanced by sufficient fit with 
regard to the other features of the global model: the endorsement of horizontal 
effect, positive obligations and social rights, and, most importantly, balancing and 
proportionality. In light of this, I do not see the fact that many countries do not 
endorse a comprehensive right to autonomy as threatening the viability of my 
theory as a reconstructive theory.  
12 GMCR, p. 128.  
13 Virgílio Afonso da Silva, ‘How Global is Global Constitutionalism?’, (2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal 
Studies (forthcoming), pp. 7-8; Alon Harel, ‘Do Legal Rights Matter? A Defence of Constitutional Rights’, 
(2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (forthcoming), 3; Porat (above n. 2), p. 6.  
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It is not only acceptable but to be expected and in a sense even necessary that 
a reconstructive theory of a complex and diverse practice takes issue with some of 
the convictions of the agents shaping the practice. If it did not, then it would not 
add anything of relevance to the discussion except the comforting but ultimately 
uninteresting insight that everyone is getting everything right already. Thus, my 
theory, by insisting that the best way to reconstruct the global model requires the 
acknowledgement of a right to autonomy, encourages the actors that shape the 
practice to reconsider their views on this issue because, as I argue in the book, 
where the practice departs from the theory, this is, all things equal, a mistake 
which should be corrected. 14 It is not a coincidence but rather the point of a 
moral reconstruction that it allows for the practice to be measured against it and 
encourages the actors that shape the practice to improve the practice in line with 
what the theory recommends.  
That said, I acknowledge in the book that there may be valid institutional or 
pragmatic considerations which justify a departure from the theory. With regard to 
the right to autonomy, I speculate that the reason that many countries do not 
protect such a right may lie in the fact that access to constitutional courts is a 
scarce resource and should arguably be granted only in the case of important 
issues, not relatively trivial ones such as feeding birds in a park.15 Afonso Da Silva 
makes the interesting observation that this explanation seems implausible in the 
case of the Brazilian Supreme Court: that court seems totally unmoved by 
considerations of workload, given that it willingly decides tens of thousands of 
cases every year.16 Now, that may be true. But it is not a challenge to the 
reconstructive nature of my theory. My theory claims that there is no principled 
way to delineate autonomy interests which attract the protection of constitutional 
rights from those which do not, and that therefore all autonomy interests ought to 
be protected. If a court fails to do so and it cannot point to any pragmatic 
justification for this – such as limiting its workload – then it simply makes a 
mistake. I do not have sufficient expertise with regard to the Brazilian legal system 
to take a definite view on this issue, but it surely seems a possibility that the 
Brazilian Supreme Court simply gets things wrong when it denies the existence of 
a general right to autonomy. For example, intuitively the judges may be drawn to 
the idea that there is a threshold which delineates an interest from a right – an idea 
that I believe to have shown to be wrong.  
Generally speaking, there are three explanations for why a court may depart 
from what my reconstructive theory recommends. First, my theory could be 
mistaken and the court right. Second, my theory may be right and the court 
mistaken. Third, there may be a good pragmatic or institutional reason for 
departure from the theory (for example, the necessity to select and focus on 
important cases). Thus, to demonstrate that my theory is unattractive as a 
reconstructive theory with regard to Brazil, Afonso da Silva would have to show 
14 GMCR, p. 21.  
15 GMCR, p. 77.  
16 Afonso da Silva (above n. 13), pp. 8-9.  
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not only that there is no valid pragmatic reason for the Brazilian Supreme Court’s 
departure from my theory, but also that the Court is justified in rejecting a 
comprehensive right to autonomy; thus, he would need to engage with my 
argument that there is no principled way of delineating rights from mere interests. 
As long as he does not show this argument to be wrong, the possibility remains 
that the Brazilian Court simply made a mistake when excluding certain interests 
from the scope of rights.  
 
2. FORMAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE 
 
Afonso Da Silva prefers Robert Alexy’s formal theory of constitutional rights17 
according to which rights are principles and optimisation requirements.18 As I 
have argued elsewhere,19 I do not believe that a formal theory of constitutional 
rights will be sufficiently illuminating of their structure. Rights are creatures of 
morality and therefore have to be analysed in moral – that is, substantive – terms. 
Whatever formal structure may turn out to illuminate constitutional rights, it can do 
so only if and to the extent that it happens to reflect the moral structure of rights. 
Robert Alexy’s famous theory is, in my view, rightly celebrated as a milestone in 
our understanding of constitutional rights. But the formal structure which Alexy 
outlines holds such a power not because it is true as a matter of logic (as Alexy 
claims) but rather because it reflects what morality has to say about the structure 
of constitutional rights. It is because as a matter of morality there is a comprehensive 
right to autonomy, and because as a matter of morality rights are interests which have 
to be brought into a balance with other interests, etc., that the formal model which 
regards rights as principles that have to be balanced against other principles has a 
great explanatory and, for some, intuitive, force. If the moral situation were 
different – say, if rights were, as James Griffin claims, a highly limited set of 
interests, or if they were, as Ronald Dworkin argued, trumps, then Alexy’s formal 
model would not hold the appeal it does because it would not illuminate their 
moral structure sufficiently well.  
Afonso da Silva further argues that the formal theory has the advantage of 
being neutral with regard to the value(s) it ranks highest and that it will therefore 
be acceptable to regions and cultures that do not hold personal autonomy in as 
high regard as I do in the book.20 For example, personal autonomy may not be 
held in high esteem in China, but a formal theory could nevertheless make sense 
of the Chinese constitution. 
In response to this, let us ask whether we could apply the formal theory to 
Nazi Germany with a (hypothetical) Nazi constitution. It would seem that we can: 
17 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 3.  
18 Afonso da Silva (above n.13), p. 4.  
19 Möller, ‘Balancing and the structure of constitutional rights’, (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 453.  
20 Afonso da Silva (above n.13), p. 6.  
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the ‘principles’ which ought to be optimised in the Nazi constitution are, say, the 
superiority of the Aryan race, the implementation of the Führer principle, and so 
on. Now, I had to put ‘principles’ in apostrophes because, of course, the 
‘principles’ I mentioned are not really principles but falsities: they carry no moral 
value at all. My theory, however, promises to deliver a morally acceptable theory 
of rights, that is, one which is based on moral principle as opposed to falsity. 
Therefore I am unimpressed by the suggestion that by keeping the theory formal, I 
could have made it acceptable to those regions or countries that do not value 
autonomy. Afonso da Silva would only have a valid objection to my theory if he 
could show that those regions that do not value autonomy are justified in doing so: 
that there is a morally defensible theory of rights which places another value or set 
of values at the top. While I cannot rule this out in the abstract, my moral intuition 
is that people value and want autonomy (freedom) and equality everywhere, and 
rightly so. My hunch is, therefore, that those countries or regions which do not 
subscribe to these values make a moral mistake. If this is true, then the fact that 
my theory will presumably not appeal to those who deny autonomy and equality 
their central place does not pose a problem for my theory as a reconstructive 
theory or for its global character. 
 
3. GLOBAL APPEAL? 
 
‘[T]he globe […] seems to be quite small’ writes Afonso Da Silva. ‘[T]ake some 
decisions of some supreme or constitutional courts of a few English speaking 
countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and South Africa, 
throw in decisions of the German Constitutional Court, and it seems you are 
already entitled to speak of the globe.’21  
Afonso Da Silva’s striking observation puts its finger on a weak spot of the 
current discourse about global constitutionalism. While his point is (deliberately) 
exaggerated, it has a true core. Is it a problem for global constitutionalism that it 
concerns itself mostly with the countries mentioned by Afonso Da Silva?  
We must not throw the baby out with the bath water. My goal in the book 
was to present a morally coherent theory of rights that fits the practice of judicial 
review in a sufficiently broad range of countries to justify referring to that practice 
as ‘global’. Precisely because my interest was in a morally coherent theory, one of 
the relevant factors for choosing the jurisdictions to consider was whether they 
would offer sufficiently interesting and important contributions to the 
development of such a theory. Conversely, prudent use of the scarce resources of 
time and energy dictated that I would not look at the practice of those countries 
that will not be able to contribute much to a coherent theory of constitutional 
rights. This means that broadly speaking, the pool of countries that remain of 
potential interest is restricted to liberal democracies. The world being what it is, 
this excludes a large share of the world’s jurisdictions.  
21 Afonso da Silva (above n.13), p. 2.  
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With regard to the remaining countries – those that can broadly be classified 
as liberal democracies – a reconstructive theorist will, again, have to set priorities 
because it will be impossible for any one theorist to study the jurisprudence of all 
those countries in depth. Given that the goal is to develop a morally appealing 
theory, the theorist will have to pick those countries which have the most to 
contribute in terms of the quality of their jurisprudence. This requires the 
inclusion of the United States – or, as in the case of my book, its exclusion 
requires a justification. U.S. jurisprudence offers the oldest and in many ways 
intellectually richest and most stimulating practice of constitutional rights 
protection in the world, and it served as the role model for existing and aspiring 
democracies, in particular after World War II. While it is currently in a deep crisis 
because of the regrettable politicisation of the legal system and while 
correspondingly its influence and perceived attractiveness are declining, it 
nevertheless continues to be of major influence. Furthermore, Germany must be 
included because of the ways in which its post-WW II jurisprudence have shaped 
the global model: the doctrines of horizontal effect and proportionality are of 
German origin, and the German Federal Constitutional Court was among the first 
courts to establish the idea of positive obligations.  
Beyond the US and Germany, the question of whom to include becomes 
more difficult. It is certainly the case that a country whose jurisprudence is 
available in English has a strategic advantage, and this may explain – though not 
justify – why Canada and South Africa are often regarded as members of the 
‘global club’. With regard to Brazil, in addition to the problem that its 
jurisprudence is not available in English, the sheer number and length of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court’s judgments will operate as a barrier to its inclusion in 
practical terms.  
But there are certainly good justifications for closely studying Canadian and 
South African jurisprudence, namely the relatively high quality of Canadian and 
South African judges and judgments. To repeat, whether a country is ‘included’ 
(that is, its rights jurisprudence studied and taken as relevant for the development 
of a morally reconstructive theory) does not depend on the country’s size, wealth, 
political power, etc., but exclusively on what its jurisprudence can contribute to 
the development of a theory of rights. Canadian and South African jurisprudence 
with its often highly interesting cases and arguments certainly passes the threshold 
of relevance. This is not to be understood as involving any judgment about the 
quality of the jurisprudence of all those liberal-democratic countries which I did 
not look at in any depth in the book – given that I know little of it, I cannot pass 
judgment. Rather, it only means that the countries which I picked did have 
something important to offer for a reconstructive theory, not that the countries 
which I left out cannot offer as much.  
The above thoughts lead me to the view that I fully agree with Afonso da 
Silva that it would be desirable to expand the list of countries regularly considered 
in discussions about global constitutionalism beyond the few countries that he 
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mentions. While I have no easy answer as to how this can be achieved, it seems 
plausible that there is a responsibility not only on the side of global 
constitutionalists but also on the sides of the respective country to ensure that its 
jurisprudence be available in English and of scholars working within a specific 
national or regional context to introduce important developments taking place 
there to the wider community of global constitutionalists.  
 
 
 
II. PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
 
1. AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY 
 
Afonso Da Silva claims that I neglect the importance of the right to equality.22 
This raises the question of the relationship between autonomy and equality, which 
is an important point on which my book may be misunderstood. True, I do talk 
mainly about personal autonomy in the first part of the book (chapters 2 to 4), and 
there is no chapter or part dedicated specifically to equality. Nevertheless, in my 
account of constitutional rights, autonomy and equality are of equal importance. 
As I argue in chapter 5, a policy is constitutionally legitimate if it is based on a 
reasonable specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens. The main 
problem for a specification of a person’s sphere of autonomy is that one person’s 
autonomy interests will usually clash with the autonomy interests of others. 
Equality is the value which is needed to resolve these conflicts: the way in which 
the policy under consideration has resolved a conflict of autonomy interests must 
be compatible with their status as equals.  
My emphasis in the first part of the book on the importance of autonomy is 
not in order to give it an importance that is greater than the importance of 
equality. Rather, it is for reasons of the best doctrinal construction of a test as to 
whether a policy (or another act by a public authority) violates constitutional 
rights. The first question to ask is whether the policy limits the right-holder’s right 
to autonomy: the duty of justification is triggered only when a policy affects the 
right-holder’s ability to live his life according to his self-conception. This explains 
why chapters 2 to 4 talk about autonomy in depth and do not need to take 
recourse to equality. The second question is whether the limitation is justifiable, 
and this is the case if it flows from a reasonable specification of the spheres of 
autonomy of equal citizens; here equality is added to the test. Given that almost all 
policies will limit someone’s autonomy, the emphasis of the test is on the second 
stage, and here autonomy and equality clearly feature on equal terms.  
Is a separate right to equality needed? I argue in the book that there is 
nothing conceptually wrong with such a right, but that it does not add anything 
that the right to autonomy does not already provide. Afonso Da Silva objects: his 
22 Afonso da Silva (above n.13), p. 10.  
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example is that a particular regulation of the right to wear a Muslim headscarf 
might be considered proportionate in isolation, but that it might nevertheless be 
constitutionally illegitimate if wearing the Christian cross is not regulated in the 
same way.23  
I agree that this case could be resolved using a right to equality. However, it 
can also be resolved by relying on the right to autonomy. The policy in Afonso Da 
Silva’s example does not specify the spheres of autonomy of Muslim women in a 
reasonable way because of the unequal treatment of Muslims compared to 
Christians. Contrary to Afonso Da Silva’s claim, it is conceptually possible to 
resolve this issue under the heading of a right to autonomy: there is an 
interference with the right to autonomy, and this interference is not justifiable 
because the policy is incoherent. I agree (and state in the book24) that the 
proportionality test as currently constructed in legal practice does not contain a 
separate coherence stage in addition to the other four stages, and that as long as 
this remains the case, there is room for a separate right to equality (which would 
perform the function of a coherence check). However, it would also be possible to 
test the coherence of a policy as part of the proportionality assessment, and then 
no need for a separate right to equality would arise. To repeat, I am all in favour of 
a right to equality, and as I made clear, I believe that the value of equality is as 
fundamental as autonomy. My point is that all policies that violate the right to 
equality will also violate the right to autonomy, and that therefore a separate right 
to equality is not needed.  
 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY 
 
Harel takes issue with my proposal of a general right to autonomy, adopts the 
position of what he calls ‘an old-fashioned rights-fetishist’25 and defends the idea 
of a catalogue of narrowly defined rights. What makes his position particularly 
interesting is that he does not walk into the trap that, in my opinion, many of the 
other ‘old fashioned rights fetishists’ have fallen into. Harel does not claim that 
there is a principled way of distinguishing those interests which attract the 
protection of rights from those which do not. This was the route that James 
Griffin took in his influential book On Human Rights,26 where he argued that those 
interests which are important for personhood qualify as human rights, whereas 
those that do not meet the personhood threshold do not. I attacked this reasoning 
by demonstrating that Griffin does not, and could not, define the threshold of 
personhood in a principled way, and I concluded that threshold theories are 
unworkable and should be abandoned in favour of a conception of rights which 
23 Afonso da Silva (above n.13), p. 10.  
24 GMCR, pp. 125-6.  
25 Harel (above n.13), p. 2.  
26 Griffin (above n.10).  
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acknowledges that all interests are protected as rights.27 This model is not only 
theoretically appealing but can also make sense of the global model with its 
tendency towards rights inflation and the inability of courts around the world of 
articulating a threshold.  
Harel takes a different route. He argues that the value of entrenching rights is 
that it creates a common culture that facilitates the exercise of autonomous 
choices. This value cannot, for Harel, be realised through a general right to 
autonomy: ‘A person cannot be asked to exercise her autonomy without specifying 
designated activities in which choices matter; without developing coherent 
rationales for the protection of such choices and without a public culture which 
grants respect to choices made within those designates spheres.’28 So for him, the 
point of legally entrenched rights is to guide citizens towards those areas in which 
autonomy is important.29  
One of my worries about this conception of the point and purpose of rights 
is that it strikes me as paternalistic. Why should I accept the guidance of 
constitutional rights, for example the guidance that expression and marriage are 
important areas of autonomy but feeding the birds or going for walks in the forest 
are not? I do not want or need this kind of guidance. But if I cannot accept it for 
myself, then I cannot claim that it would be acceptable to impose it on others. Just 
as Harel claims to be an old fashioned rights fetishist, so am I: to my mind 
constitutional rights are designed to promote or reflect my freedom and equality, 
not to paternalistically guide me and educate me about the areas of life where 
autonomy matters.  
However, while constitutions must not tell people how to live their lives, their 
design can surely reflect conventional wisdom about what people regard as 
important for their own lives. This is why I have no principled objection to a 
catalogue of rights, as opposed to simply one comprehensive right to autonomy. 
These catalogues reflect those areas of life that have proven to be important to 
people: free expression, religion, property, and so on. But the justification of these 
catalogues is not to guide people but to reflect their already-existing self-
conceptions about what is important for their lives. Furthermore, a general right 
to autonomy is needed partly in order to protect precisely those activities and 
personal resources the enjoyment of which is not widely shared: even if I am the 
only person in my country who enjoys feeding the birds, my right to do so must 
be protected and cannot be denied to me on the ground that in my country, its 
protection is not required because it cannot contribute to an autonomy-enhancing 
culture, given that nobody else wishes to use their autonomy in this way. It would 
be closer to the truth to say that especially when I am the only one in the whole 
country who wants to engage in this activity, I need the protection of 
constitutional rights because constitutional rights are not only for those with 
conventional tastes or those willing to accept the guidance of the constitution; 
27 GMCR, 75-77.  
28 Harel (above n.13), p. 7.  
29 Harel (above n.13), p. 4.  
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they are also for those whose tastes are idiosyncratic and those who may be 
outsiders.  
While I disagree with Harel’s more specific argument about the importance of 
autonomy, I do think that he has a valid, original, and important point to make 
about the value of rights. The entrenchment of rights does serve an important 
public-culture related value, but it is not the one Harel has in mind (guiding people 
to areas of life where autonomy is important). Rather, entrenching the conception 
of rights which I advocate in my book contributes to the creation of a public 
culture where a certain attitude towards state authority is displayed by the 
citizenry: an attitude that insists that actions by public authorities, to be 
constitutionally legitimate, must always be justifiable as a matter of substance. Put 
differently: a citizen who asks why she should obey a certain law or administrative 
decision must always be given a better reply than ‘Because the state said so’. In 
addition to a procedural requirement for legitimate authority (someone must have 
issued a directive in line with certain procedures, for example a vote in parliament) 
there is a substantive requirement, namely that the directive in question be 
justifiable as a matter of substance, that is, that it be based on a reasonable 
specification of the spheres of autonomy of equal citizens. Citizens who 
understand that the law is based on this understanding of legitimate authority will 
take a critical attitude towards political authorities and will insist that the authority 
always justify its actions (and omissions). This brings with it a number of benefits. 
First, it is empowering for the individual citizen who knows that he can force the 
authority to defend itself and justify its actions (individual empowerment). Second, it 
forces public authorities to work in a careful and coherent way if they want their 
decisions to stand (good governance). Third, it fosters a common culture that 
understands that political authority is based not exclusively on procedure but also 
on substance, and therefore directs part of the democratic discourse to a 
discussion focussing on the justifiability of the authority’s acts (justification-oriented 
discourse). Thus, Harel is right to point out that there is more to rights than the 
values which they protect (such as autonomy and equality). One of the reasons 
supporting the legal entrenchment of constitutional rights under the global model 
is that such entrenchment promotes a public culture oriented towards the three 
values listed above.  
 
 
 
III. JUSTIFICATION 
 
Porat claims that there are, structurally, two models of rights which he refers to as 
the outcome-based (or protected interests) model and the intent-based (or 
excluded reasons) model.30 According to the former, what matters most is the 
30 Porat (above n. 2), p. 8.  
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importance of the interest at stake, whereas according to the latter, what matters 
most is the reason for the restriction of the right. Porat believes in the superiority 
of the intent-based model and relies on the Israeli Horev case to demonstrate his 
point.31 In that case, the Israeli government prohibited the use of a street in 
Jerusalem in order to protect the religious feelings of ultra orthodox Jews living 
close by. Porat’s argument is that those outraged by the ban did not point to the 
importance of the interest at stake (avoiding a short detour) but rather to the 
reasons for the restriction (presumably the perceived absence of a secular 
justification). The point can be generalised, for Porat, the argument being that 
focusing on the importance of the interest at stake is unhelpful and a distraction 
and we should instead reason about rights by focusing on the reasons for their 
restriction.  
My reply to this criticism is that both the outcome-based and the intent-based 
models are deficient. Porat has demonstrated that the outcome-based model is 
unattractive; however, since I do not advocate that model, this is not an attack on 
my theory. I fully agree with his account of an important weakness of the 
outcome-based model: if that model were correct, then the more important an 
interest is to the right-holder, the more protection it receives, and this cannot be 
right.32 If it were, then those who shout the loudest and make the greatest 
demands would in return get the highest protection. For example, a religion that 
has strong ideas about how everyone else should live and about how society 
should be organised would be entitled to more protection than another religion 
which has no such preferences and simply requires their adherents to pray and 
care only about their own relationship with their god; this cannot be right because 
it would lead to discrimination between different religious groups.  
But Porat’s preferred alternative, the intent-based model, is not attractive 
either, at least not unless one stretches the idea of excluded reasons so far that it 
involves at least sometimes the assessment of the weight of the respective 
interests. Porat is right that there are some cases which can be resolved entirely by 
pointing to the impermissible reasons on which the state relied. Take the example 
of an anti-sodomy law which is defended on the grounds of homosexuality being 
morally destructive to society. This case can easily be resolved without taking 
recourse to the importance of the interest in being free to engage in sodomy by 
pointing to the fact that the reason given involves moralism and is therefore not 
acceptable. However, I do not believe that we can resolve all constitutional rights 
cases in this straightforward way. Usually, when reaching the balancing stage 
within the proportionality assessment, the weight of the respective interests is 
compared. Now, as Porat notices, in my account of balancing, determining the 
weight of the right-holder’s right requires more than just establishing the 
importance of the respective interest for the agent. Rather, many other 
31 Porat (above n. 2), p. 10.  
32 Porat (above n. 2), p. 12.  
 15 
                                                     
                         28/2014 
 
considerations come into play as well.33 However, in the course of determining 
how much weight to attach to a specific interest, the importance of the interest for 
the agent must always be the starting point. Even in Porat’s example this is the 
case, even though he chose it to prove the opposite point. One possible way to 
defend the ban in the Horev case is to see it as an act of accommodation. Especially 
in cases involving religion we sometimes accommodate people even when this 
imposes an otherwise unjustifiable burden on others (for example by making an 
otherwise illegal drug available if used in the context of a religious ceremony). 
Thus, in the Horev case it seems to me that a judge deciding the case should ask 
herself whether the ultra orthodox Jews’ interest in ‘the maintaining of a special 
religious atmosphere’34 in their neighbourhood justifies accommodating them by 
closing down the street that runs through their neighbourhood, thus imposing an 
otherwise unjustifiable two minute detour on drivers. The balancing that is 
required here is not of a consequentialist kind, and the determination of the weight 
that should be attached to the ultra orthodox Jews’ interests involves more than 
simply asking the question of ‘how important is it to the ultra-orthodox Jews that 
this street be closed?’. But the crucial point is that it also involves asking this 
question because if the answer were ‘not very important’ then any claim to 
accommodation would not even get off the ground. From how Porat presents the 
case, the main worry about the government’s decision is the fear that the 
respective group’s agenda is to impose religious rules on more and more aspects 
of Israel’s public life. If that is so, then this is surely also a consideration that must 
be taken into account in the balancing process. Thus, it is imaginable that in a 
different country with a different religious setup (that is, where the religious group 
does not have an agenda to dominate public life), accommodation of the kind that 
happened in the Horev case might be justifiable, whereas in the Horev case it may 
not have been. This, again, shows that it is not sufficient to focus exclusively on 
excluded reasons and to set aside categorically the necessity of recurring to the 
importance of certain interests.  
The preferable approach is to accept that reasoning with rights has a complex 
structure which involves both the assessment of the importance of certain 
interests and the exclusion of certain reasons. This is the model that I advocate in 
my book. I argue that structurally, the assessment of whether an act by a public 
authority violates rights starts with the question of whether the right-holder’s 
rights, understood as his autonomy interests, have been limited. If this is so, then 
the following question is whether this limitation is justifiable, and this depends on, 
in particular, whether a clash between the right-holder’s interests and those of 
others or the public has been resolved in a reasonable way. This is, on the one 
hand, reasoning with interests (and in this sense it can be described as interest-
33 See GMCR, ch. 6.  
34 See Porat (above n. 2), fn. 27.  
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based), and on the other hand, it will sometimes involve the exclusion of certain 
reasons (such as moralistic or paternalistic reasons).  
Thus, it is a mistake to reduce reasoning with rights exclusively to a 
‘consequentialist’ weighing up of interests, just as it is a mistake to reduce it to a 
‘deontological’ act of excluding certain reasons. Reasoning with rights is 
deontological in nature because it is about assessing whether an act by a public 
authority is justifiable to the person affected by it and because this justification 
does not depend exclusively on outcome-based considerations (and contrary to a 
common misunderstanding it is not a feature of deontology that it is insensitive to 
consequences; all that deontology claims is that outcomes are not necessarily and 
in all cases the only thing that matters). But while it is deontological, it involves 
both outcome-sensitive and outcome-insensitive ways of reasoning, and it involves 
reasoning with interests and reasoning about the acceptability of certain reasons.  
Porat thinks that he has found a way around assessing the strength of certain 
interests by relying on the idea of indifference.35 According to this approach, the 
government must not show indifference to the right-holder. But how can we 
establish the existence of an indifferent attitude? The answer must be: by asking 
whether the right-holder’s interests have been taken into account adequately. 
Where the government fails to take a person’s interests into account adequately, it 
shows indifference to him or her. But the assessment of whether the government 
has taken the right-holder’s interests adequately into account will often require 
balancing and proportionality analysis. Thus, all that the indifference approach 
does is to put a new label on balancing and proportionality.  
Take as an example the Odievre case,36 which was about an adopted woman 
who claimed a right against the French government to be told the identity of her 
biological mother who had released her for adoption after birth. This case did not 
involve moralism, paternalism or any other excluded reasons; rather, the European 
Court of Human Rights asked itself whether France had weighed up the respective 
interests in an acceptable way: the identity-based interest of the applicant in 
finding out about her own history; the interests of the adoptive family; the interest 
of the biological mother in remaining anonymous; the interest of society in 
showing pregnant women an alternative to abortion (by making anonymous 
adoption available). This case seems to me to be a paradigm example of a case 
whose satisfactory resolution requires striking a balance between different 
conflicting considerations. The idea of balancing is however not available to Porat 
because he believes that the only legitimate way of reasoning with rights is the 
exclusion of certain reasons. He would therefore ask whether the French 
government showed indifference towards Ms Odievre. But in order to establish 
whether the government indeed showed such indifference, he would have to 
assess the balance between the interests at stake: if the refusal to release the name 
35 Porat (above n. 2), p. 15.  
36 Odievre v. France, (2004) 38 EHRR 43.  
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of her biological mother to Ms Odievre imposed a disproportionate burden on 
her, then it would display indifference.  
To generalise the point, we cannot, as Porat claims, use the idea of 
indifference as a way to avoid balancing and proportionality because the 
establishment of whether indifference was present will involve, precisely, 
balancing and proportionality analysis. Thus, we cannot rely on an excluded 
reasons model alone unless we extend the idea of excluded reasons so far that in 
substance it incorporates balancing and proportionality under the heading of an 
excluded reason such as ‘indifference’.  
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